Rule I The aim of our studies must be the direction of our mind so that it may form solid and true judgments on whatever matters arise. II We must occupy ourselves only with those objects that our intellectual powers appear competent to know certainly and indubitably. III As regards any subject we propose to investigate, we must inquire not what other people have thought, or what we ourselves conjecture, but what we can clearly and manifestly perceive by intuition or deduce with certainty. For there is no other way of acquiring knowledge. IV There is need of a method for finding out the truth. V Method consists entirely in the order and disposition of the objects towards which our mental vision must be directed if we would find out any truth.
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Beyssade, Jean-Marie. Boutrox, Pierre. Paris: Alcan. Descartes recognized this conception to be practically unattainable; his algebraic geometry was merely the most useful and convenient compromise he could find. The thesis rests on distinctions between "imagination" acting in time and "understanding" outside time; memory and perception; deductive reasoning and immediate cognition.
Cassan, Elodie. Cobb-Stevens, Richard. Costabel, Pierre. Repris dans: P. Napoli: Vivarium. Canadian Philosophy Review no. Fichant, Michel. Repris dans: M. Lien entre geometrie et algebre. Gajano, Alberto. Gontier, Thierry. Israel, Giorgio. Paris: Vrin. Lauth, Reinhard. Sur le livre de Jean-Paul Weber Loi, Maurice.
Lojacono, Ettore. Science cartesienne et savoir aristotelicien dans les Regulae. Martineau, Emmanuel. Milhaud, Gaston. Repris dans G. Olivo, Gilles. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Pironet, Fabienne. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale no. Rabouin, David. Mathesis universalis.
Aristote 37; II. La quaestio de scientia mathematica communi ; Annexe II. Essai bibliographique sur la mathesis universalis chez Descartes et Leibniz ; Bibliographie ; Index nominum Les Regulae et leur place dans la philosophie de Descartes. Paris: Ellipses. Plus de Actes du Serfati, Michel. La constitution du texte des Regulae. Chapitre I. English Studies Beck, Leslie John. The Method of Descartes.
A Study of the Regulae. Oxford: Clarendon Press. See in particular Chapter XII. The Science of Order pp. Brissey, Patrick. Clarke, Desmond M. Reprinted in: G. Moyal ed. Critical Assessments, New York: Routledge, , vol. Dijksterhuis, Fokko Jan. Review of: John Schuster: Descartes-agonistes: Physico-mathematics, method and corpuscular-mechanism Doyle, Bret J.
Gaukroger, Stephen. Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, edited by Gaukroger, Stephen, Brighton: Harvester Press. Harries, Karsten. Hintikka, Jaakko. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Joachim, Harold H. Klein, Julie R. Kraus, Pamela Ann. Lachterman, David R. McRae, Robert. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Chapter: Descartes: the Project of a Universal Science, pp.
Miner, Robert C. Cambridge: Scholars Press. Palmer, Eric. Atascadero: Ridgeview. Dordrecht: Springer. Not yet published. Recker, Doren A. Sasaki, Chikara. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Schmitter, Amy M. Schuster, John. Sussex: Harvester Press. New York: Springer. Chapter 5. Sebba, Gregor. Sepper, Dennis L. Berkeley: Univrsity of California Press. Sergei, Talander. Smith, Nathan D. Bucarest: Zeta Books. Unpublished Ph.
In order to begin an analysis of the Regulae , one must first attempt to resolve textual disputes concerning its integrity and one must understand the text as a historical work, dialectically situated in the tradition of late sixteenth and early seventeenth century thought.
The dissertation provides this historical backdrop and textual sensitivity throughout, but it focuses on three main themes.
First, the concept of mathesis universalis is taken to be the organizing principle of the work. This methodological principle defines a workable technique for solving mathematical problems, a means for applying mathematics to natural philosophical explanations, and a claim concerning the nature of mathematical truth.
In each case, the mathesis universalis is designed to fit the innate capacities of the mind and the objects studied by mathesis are set apart from the mind as purely mechanical and geometrically representable objects. In this account, Descartes describes perception as a mechanical process up to the moment of conscious awareness. This point of awareness and the corresponding actions of the mind are, he claims, independent from mechanical principles; they are incorporeal and cannot be explained reductively.
Finally, when Descartes outlines the explanatory bases of his natural science, he identifies certain "simple natures. Descartes makes an explicit distinction between material simples and intellectual simples.
Regulae ad directionem ingenii